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Bagby & Associates 
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Paoli Executive Green II, Suite 301 
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 in No. 11-3584 
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OPINION 
_______________ 
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge
 Plaintiff Meir Gelley appeals from the August 12, 2011 order of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania insofar as it entered judgment in 
favor of Defendant Park Pleasant, Inc., and against Gelley on Gelley’s breach of contract 
claim.  Because we determine that the District Court committed reversible error with 
respect to the well-established “time of the essence” doctrine, we will vacate and remand 
with instructions to the District Court to enter a judgment of specific performance in 
favor of Gelley and against Park Pleasant.   
. 
I. 
 On July 14, 2008, Gelley and Park Pleasant executed a Purchase and Sale 
Agreement.  For a total price of $7.8 million, Gelley agreed to buy Park Pleasant’s 
Philadelphia nursing home business as well as a several parcels of real estate.  He was 
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required to pay an initial “Deposit” of $50,000.00 within two business days, which was 
done.  According to the Agreement, the term “‘Additional Deposit’ means the sum of 
[$250,000.00] which shall be deposited by Buyer into escrow with Escrow Agent upon 
the conclusion of the Due Diligence Period, together with all interest and earnings 
thereon, if any.”  (JA97-JA98.)  The “Due Diligence Period” was then defined as “the 
period ending at 5:00 p.m. on September 5, 2008.”  (JA98.)  The closing date was set for 
November 30, 2008. 
 On August 13, 2008, Gelley had a dinner meeting with Nancy Kleinberg, Park 
Pleasant’s administrator and co-owner.  He specifically expressed concern about the 
nursing home’s case mix index (“CMI”).1
The parties then engaged in further discussions over the next few weeks.  On 
September 5, 2008, Kleinberg’s attorney (Michael Krekstein, Esquire) left his counterpart 
(Joanne Judge, Esquire) a voicemail message stating, inter alia, that, because the parties 
had been unable to agree on a price, there was no reason to discuss an extension of the 
  According to Gelley, his consultants believed 
that some residents may have been receiving unnecessary therapy in order to raise the 
CMI and that, if he were to take over the nursing home, he would be unable to continue 
this practice.  The consultants purportedly believed that this practice—while most likely 
not fraudulent in nature—could be considered as a form of “abuse.”  (JA241, JA624.)  
Gelley accordingly proposed a reduction in the purchase price.     
                                                 
1 The CMI is a numerical index measuring the amount of services administered to 
residents (i.e., more services results in a higher index and, in turn, more Medicaid 
reimbursement for the nursing home). 
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Due Diligence Period.  In a subsequent e-mail to Krekstein, Judge purported to accept 
Krekstein’s August 19, 2008 offer to extend the Due Diligence Period until September 
26, 2008.  Krekstein then sent a letter to Judge stating that Gelley “is in default of the 
Agreement by having failed to put up his additional deposit, and this will confirm the 
seller’s decision to terminate the Agreement.”  (JA199.)  While Gelley paid the 
Additional Deposit into escrow on September 26, 2008, Park Pleasant refused to close on 
the transaction.  Gelley accordingly commenced the current action. 
On February 15, 2011, the District Court determined, inter alia, that the Statute of 
Frauds did not preclude Gelley’s claim for specific performance.  A bench trial was then 
held before the District Court.  In an August 12, 2011 order, the District Court, among 
other things, entered judgment in favor of Park Pleasant and against Gelley on his breach 
of contract claim.  It also issued an extensive memorandum setting forth its findings of 
fact and conclusions of law.  In particular, the District Court stated that it “need not 
determine whether time was of the essence or whether the plaintiff’s breach was material, 
because payment of the second deposit by the close of due diligence was an explicit 
condition of the agreement and failure to satisfy a condition allowed for termination.”  
Gelley v. Park Pleasant, Inc.
 
, Civil Action No. 09-0057, 2011 WL 3564797, at *13 (E.D. 
Pa. Aug. 11, 2011) (footnote omitted).  Both Gelley and Park Pleasant filed notices of 
appeal. 
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II.       
“[A] ‘condition precedent’ may be defined as a condition that must occur before a 
duty to perform under a contract arises.” 2  Boro Constr., Inc. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 992 
A.2d 208, 215 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010) (citing Beaver Dam Outdoors Club v. Hazleton 
City Auth., 944 A.2d 97 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008)).  However, even if payment of the 
$250,000.00 Additional Deposit constituted a condition precedent, we still must consider 
whether time was of the essence for the performance of this condition.  It is well 
established that “[t]ime is not of the essence in a contract unless it is specifically so 
provided or unless the circumstances clearly indicate that it was the intent of the parties.”  
Bogojavlensky v. Logan, 124 A.2d 412, 415 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956) (citing Morrell v. 
Broadbent
The District Court failed to apply this well-established “time of the essence” 
doctrine.  We accordingly must reject Park Pleasant’s theory that the District Court 
implicitly determined that time was of the essence in this case.  In fact, the District Court 
explicitly stated that it “need not determine whether time was of the essence.”  
, 140 A. 500 (Pa. 1928)).           
Gelley
                                                 
2 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this diversity case pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332, and we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The 
parties agree that Pennsylvania substantive law applies to this contract dispute.  It also is 
undisputed that we review the District Court’s findings of fact for clear error and exercise 
de novo review over its legal conclusions.   
, 
2011 WL 3564797, at *13 (footnote omitted).  Applying this doctrine ourselves, we 
ultimately determine that neither the language of the Agreement nor the surrounding 
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circumstances clearly indicated that time was of the essence with respect to the payment 
of the Additional Deposit. 
It is uncontested that the Agreement itself lacked any express “time is of the 
essence” clause or language.  It did state that all of its provisions “shall be deemed and 
construed to be ‘conditions’ and ‘covenants’” (JA124), but this language applied to every 
single provision in the Agreement and lacked any specific reference to time periods or 
deadlines.  Turning to the other provisions in the Agreement, we observe that:  (1) 
pursuant to Section 8.1.1(iv), Park Pleasant was permitted to terminate the Agreement “if 
any of the conditions in Section 3.6 has not been satisfied as of the Closing Date or if 
satisfaction of such a condition is or becomes impossible” (JA121 (emphasis added)); (2) 
under Section 3.6.1, Park Pleasant was not obligated to consummate the closing unless 
and until Gelley “shall have performed and complied in all material respects with all of its 
obligations under this Agreement which are to be performed or complied with by it prior 
to or on the Closing Date” (JA107-JA108 (emphasis added)); and (3) Section 3.7 
provided that, “[i]f any of the conditions in Paragraph 3.6 have not been satisfied on or 
before the Closing Date, Seller, shall have as its sole remedy the right either to . . . (b) 
terminate this Agreement and proceed in accordance with Section 8.4.1” (JA108 
(emphasis added)).  At the very least, these provisions could reasonably be read as 
establishing that Gelley’s performance of conditions by the Closing Date would be 
sufficient under the Agreement and that Park Pleasant would then have no grounds to 
terminate the Agreement or to refuse to go ahead with the closing.  The Agreement 
7 
 
actually placed even more emphasis on the Closing Date by stating that, 
“[n]otwithstanding any provision in this Agreement to the contrary, this Agreement shall 
automatically terminate if the Closing has not occurred by November 30, 2008, unless 
extended by mutual agreement of the parties.”  (JA121.)  We note the absence of any 
similar contractual language relating to the payment of the Additional Deposit. 
Turning to the surrounding circumstances, we do take into account the various 
contentions raised by Park Pleasant (i.e., the Agreement did not obligate or bind Gelley 
until the end of the Due Diligence Period and Gelley’s payment of the Additional Deposit 
by September 5, 2008, and this date was itself the product of negotiations between the 
parties).  Nevertheless, we determine that the circumstances, especially when considered 
in the light of the contractual language discussed above, did not “clearly indicate that it 
was the intent of the parties” to make time of the essence to the payment of the Additional 
Deposit.  Bogojavlensky, 124 A.2d at 415 (citation omitted).  We specifically note that it 
was Krekstein (at Kleinberg’s own direction) that first made an offer to extend the Due 
Diligence Period.  This offer and the subsequent communications regarding, among other 
things, a possible extension of time would seem to be at odds with the supposedly critical 
nature of the September 5, 2008 date.  Furthermore, neither the parties nor their attorneys 
ever clearly indicated to their respective counterparts that time was of the essence here.  
For instance, Krekstein did not say in his September 5, 2008 voicemail message to Judge 
that time was of the essence or that his client would otherwise insist on performance by 
5:00 p.m. 
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In the end, Gelley’s “mere failure to perform on the date mentioned in a contract is 
not per se a breach which wholly destroys the contract.”  Id. at 416 (citations omitted).  
We further determine that this failure and delay in making the Additional Deposit did not 
otherwise rise to the level of a material breach of the Agreement, especially given the 
apparent absence of any significant changes or actions on the part of Park Pleasant (i.e., 
any attempt by Park Pleasant to sell the nursing home business and real estate to another 
party, any significant new commitment of funds, or any significant changes in 
management) in the relatively short period of time between the September 5, 2008 date 
and the subsequent payment of the Additional Deposit on September 26, 2008.  See, e.g., 
id.
Accordingly, the District Court’s August 12, 2011 order will be vacated insofar as 
it entered judgment in favor of Park Pleasant and against Gelley on Gelley’s breach of 
contract claim.  Given the circumstances of this case as well as the District Court’s 
findings of fact, we determine that Gelley is entitled to the remedy of specific 
performance under Pennsylvania law.  
 (“Being of the opinion that the time for delivery of possession was not of the essence, 
the question remains whether defendant’s failure to deliver possession on October 1, 
1955, amounted to a breach of sufficient materiality to warrant plaintiffs’ attempt to 
cancel the contract and demand the refund of the money paid.”).   
See, e.g., Cimina v. Bronich, 537 A.2d 1355, 1358 
(Pa. 1988) (“Mindful of this caution, specific performance should only be granted where 
the facts clearly establish the plaintiff’s right thereto, where adequate remedy at law does 
not exist, and where justice requires it.” (citing Clark v. Pa. State Police, 436 A.2d 1383 
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(Pa. 1981); Roth v. Hartl, 75 A.2d 583 (Pa. 1950))).  We therefore will remand with 
instructions to the District Court to enter a judgment of specific performance in favor of 
Gelley and against Park Pleasant. 3
III. 
   
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s order of August 12, 
2011 insofar as it entered judgment in favor of Park Pleasant and against Gelley on 
Gelley’s breach of contract claim, and we will remand with instructions to the District 
Court to enter a judgment of specific performance in favor of Gelley and against Park 
Pleasant. 
                                                 
3 Because we determine that the District Court committed reversible error with respect to 
the “time of the essence” doctrine, we need not—and do not—reach the other issues 
raised by Gelley in its appeal.  We likewise will dismiss Park Pleasant’s cross-appeal 
from the District Court’s Statute of Frauds ruling as moot because our “time of the 
essence” ruling does not involve any parol modification of the written Agreement.  See, 
e.g., Target Sportswear, Inc. v. Clearfield Found., 474 A.2d 1142, 1149 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1984) (“‘“When therefore a party to an executory agreement in writing for the sale of 
lands succeeds in reforming it by oral testimony he reduces the whole agreement to a 
parol contract, and deprives himself of the right to have it specifically performed.”’” 
(quoting Brown v. Aiken, 198 A. 441, 447 (Pa. 1938))). 
 
 Park Pleasant has waived any challenge to the District Court’s rejection of its 
breach of contract counterclaim by failing to raise and brief on appeal the District Court’s 
ruling on this counterclaim.  We also will not review Park Pleasant’s quantum meruit 
counterclaim, which the District Court below dismissed as moot in light of its decision for 
Park Pleasant on Gelley’s breach of contract claim.  Park Pleasant did not raise or brief 
this issue on appeal. 
